Culture, Self-Construal, and Leisure Theory and Practice

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According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), although European North Americans are more likely to have independent self-construals (and therefore to value being unique, expressing one's inner attributes, etc.), people in or from Asia, Africa, and Southern Europe are more likely to have interdependent self-construals (and therefore to value belonging, maintaining harmony, etc.). The type of self-construal a person has affects his or her emotions, cognitions, and motivations. In the case of intrinsic motivation, for example, it is often put forth that the key factor affecting this variable is autonomy/personal choice. Recent research suggests, however, that while this may be true for independent selves, relatedness may be more important for interdependent selves. Because intrinsic motivation and autonomy/personal choice are present in many leisure theories, and leisure theories often influence leisure practice, the concept of self-construal may have great import for our field. In order to support this proposition, this article: (a) describes what self-construal is and how it affects intrinsic motivation; (b) reviews some of the major leisure theories that include intrinsic motivation and discusses how the above may affect them; (c) outlines the implications of not incorporating self-construal into leisure practice, using benefits based programming (Rossman & Schlatter, 2000) as an exemplar; and (d) examines some of the conceptual and methodological concerns associated with self-construal.

KEYWORDS: Benefits, culture, discrimination, intrinsic motivation, leisure, self-construal, theory.

According to Floyd (1998), one of the fundamental challenges facing scholars in ethnic/racial leisure research is the need to develop viable theoretical frameworks. One way this could begin to occur would be to include new intervening variables that might help explain similarities and differences in leisure (Hutchison, 2000). The benefit of doing so could extend well beyond ethnic/racial leisure research, however, as Stodolska (2000) contends that, "studying minority groups provides a rare opportunity for expanding theory applicable to human leisure experience in general" (p. 158). If Stodolska's contention is correct, because leisure theory often affects and even

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directs leisure practice, it follows, therefore, that the inclusion of new inter-
vening variables and the subsequent development of viable theoretical frame-
works in ethnic/racial leisure research could also benefit leisure practice in 
general. Based on this rationale, this article proposes that leisure theory and 
practice, generally, could be advanced appreciably if Markus and Kitayama's 
(1991) concept of self-construal was duly recognized and widely employed.

In order to support this proposition, we begin by describing what self-
construal is, how it is influenced by culture, and how it, in turn, influences 
a person’s cognitions, emotions, and motivations. Although our description 
depends heavily on Markus and Kitayama's (1991; 1994; Kitayama & Markus, 
1990) and colleagues' (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Kitay-
am, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; 
Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996) research, we also report the results of 
Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier's (2002) recent meta-analysis of indi-
vidualism and collectivism (under which self-construal and other similar con-
cepts are sometimes subsumed). We begin the second section with a brief 
overview of Deci and Ryan's (1985) self-determination theory, before review-
ing recent psychological research that suggests self-construal can affect in-
trinsic motivation. In the third section we describe some of the major leisure 
theories that include intrinsic motivation and, based on our previous discus-
sion of self-construal and intrinsic motivation, we discuss what these findings 
may mean for the future development of leisure theory. In the penultimate 
section, we outline what the implications might be of not incorporating self-
construal into leisure practice, using benefits based programming (Rossman 
& Schlatter, 2000) as an exemplar. In the final section, we briefly examine 
some of the conceptual and methodological concerns that must be addressed 
in any discussion of culture, self-construal, and leisure theory and practice.

Culture and Self-Construal

Over the past decade, psychologists have begun to recognize that cul-
tures often differ in their worldviews and, as a consequence, members of 
different cultural groups can have different self structures and processes. 
Markus and Kitayama (1994), for example, contrast American culture’s em-
phasis on individual, inalienable rights (e.g., “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” in the Declaration of Independence), with Chinese culture’s em-
phasis on hierarchy and group harmony (e.g., as conveyed in Confucius' The 
Analects, 1996). Markus and Kitayama (1991) propose that, while people in 
the United States and Canada (or, more accurately, European Americans and 
European Canadians), as well as people in Western Europe, are more likely 
to have independent self-construals (and, therefore, to value being unique, 
asserting oneself, expressing one’s inner attributes, and promoting one’s own 
goals), people in or from Asia, Africa, and Southern Europe are more likely 
to have interdependent self-construals (and, therefore, to value belonging, fit-
ting in, maintaining harmony, restraining oneself, and promoting others’ 
goals). It is important to add that: (a) while cultures may emphasize one
more than the other, every culture recognizes and legitimates some aspects of both independence and interdependence and, correspondingly, at the person level, "there are elements of both independence and interdependence in every self" (Fiske et al., 1998, p. 925); and (b) "interdependent selves do not attend to the needs, desires, and goals of all others. Attention to others is not indiscriminate; it is highly selective and will be most characteristic of relationships with 'in-group' members" (Markus & Kitayama, p. 229).

Markus and Kitayama (1991) believe that the type of self-construal a person has also affects his or her cognitions, emotions, and motivations. In regard to the cognitive domain, individuals with interdependent selves may "be more attentive and sensitive to others than those with independent selves. The attentiveness and sensitivity to others, characterizing the interdependent selves, will result in a relatively greater cognitive elaboration of the other or of the self-in-relation-to-other" (Markus & Kitayama, p. 231). For example, in Chinese culture (the interdependent culture the authors are the most familiar with), such attention and sensitivity are key components of li (i.e., ritual propriety), one of the three Confucian principles regulating social behavior. Thus, "Chinese expect people to anticipate others' needs or to know their feelings without asking or being told; to do otherwise indicates poor social skills or a characterological deficit" (Gabrenya & Hwang, 1996, p. 315).

Research suggests that these differences in self-construal may also affect the emotional domain. For example, based on earlier research (Kitayama & Markus, 1990), Markus and Kitayama (1991) believe that, in addition to the excitement and pleasantness dimensions that Western-based research (Russell, 1980) has identified, people with interdependent self-construals may experience a third affective dimension, "one representing the extent to which the individual is engaged or disengaged from an interpersonal relationship" (p. 238). Additionally, Tsai and Levenson (1997) found that Chinese Americans were more likely to report both emotional moderation as well as fewer periods of positive affect than European Americans. Finally, while Westerners largely subscribe to the psychological and physiological benefits of emotional display and release (e.g., Pennebaker, 1982), emotional expressions such as love, anger, and joy are typically kept covert in Chinese culture (Gao, 1996; Gao, Ting-Toomey, & Gudykunst, 1996). According to Bond (1993; Bond & Hwang, 1986), by moderating their emotions and limiting their emotional expressiveness (i.e., hanxu), Chinese believe they are better able to maintain harmony with others (i.e., suihe).

The motivational domain may also differ depending upon the type of self-construal a person has. For example, for people with independent selves, feeling good about oneself requires fulfilling the tasks associated with being an independent self (e.g., being unique, expressing one's inner attributes); while, for people with interdependent selves, positive feelings derive from fulfilling the tasks associated with being an interdependent self (e.g., belonging, maintaining harmony, fitting in, occupying one's proper place; Markus & Kityama, 1991). As a consequence, while European North Americans
emphasize self-expression and self-assertion, because Chinese culture places
greater import on fitting in and occupying one's proper place (i.e., *zun bei*
you xu; Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Gao, 1996), modesty and humility
(i.e., *qian xujin shen*) are highly regarded (Gao, 1996; Gao, Ting-Toomey,
& Gudykunst, 1996). Leisure research conducted by Walker, Deng, and Dieser
(2001) supports the above, with their study finding that autonomy/independence
was a significantly more important motivation for European North
Americans visiting a national park, while group membership and humility/modesty
were significantly more important motivations for Chinese/Chinese
Canadians visiting the same park.

Although the concept of self-construal is largely unknown in leisure
studies, Oyserman et al. (2002) identified (by searching electronic databases
and using the keywords individualism, collectivism, independence, interde-
pendence, self-construal, allocentrism, and idiocentrism), 83 different stud-
ies of individualism (i.e., IND) and collectivism (i.e., COL) in psychology,
and 170 studies that examined the psychological implications of IND and
COL. Oysterman et al. also found that these studies measured IND and COL
using 27 distinct scales, and that the content of these scales varied consid-
erably. In regard to the latter, they subsequently identified seven major IND
domains (i.e., independent, own goals, compete, unique, private, self-
knowledge, and direct communication) and eight major COL domains (i.e.,
related, belong, duty, harmony, advice, context, hierarchy, and group work
preference), which accounted for 88% of the items across each of the scales.

In their study, Oyserman et al. (2002) compared IND and COL, both
separately and together, between: (a) European Americans/Canadians and
people living in eight regions (e.g., Africa, East Asia); (b) European Amer-
icans/Canadians and people living in 47 countries (e.g., Vietnam, Japan, and
Korea from the East Asia region), and (c) European Americans and Asian
Americans, African Americans, and Latino Americans living in the United
States. Due to space limitations we do not describe all of Oyserman et al.'s
study results but, instead, we: report their summary findings; elaborate on
two of their caveats, as well as proposing one of our own; and encourage
those who are interested to read their original article and the invited re-
sponses to it. In regard to their summary findings, Oysterman et al. begin
with the rhetorical question:

Are European Americans [and European Canadians] higher in IND (and lower
in COL) than others? Given the present database, the answer is a qualified yes.
Americans tend to be higher than others in IND and lower in COL, but there
are several caveats. First, effect sizes tend to be small. Second, effects do not
hold for Latin or South Americans or for African Americans. Third, effects for
Asians and East Asians are diverse, with the largest effects occurring for people
of Chinese origin and the smallest effects for Japanese and Koreans. Fourth, it
is not entirely clear whether high IND and low COL is an American or a West-
ern way of being because research to date has not sufficiently documented the
nature of differences between European and English-speaking countries. Fifth,
little research is available for many countries, and more is required if we are
to understand the multifaceted nature of cultural ways of being connected and related to others, as opposed to seeking harmony or feeling obligated to them. (p. 28)

Of these five caveats, two are particularly deserving of elaboration. First, although some effects were found to be small in size, one reason this may have occurred is because over 80% of the studies used undergraduate students, and research by Sinha, Sinha, Verma, and Sinha (2001) and others (Triandis & Singelis; cited in Triandis, 1995) has found that education has a positive effect on individualism. Second, the finding that African Americans were actually higher on IND and the same on COL compared with European Americans was not totally unexpected, as an earlier study by Oyserman's two co-authors had also found this result. That discovery led Coon and Kemmelmeier (2001) to conclude that, “the specific history of African Americans and their continuing exposure to prejudice may have...created an emphasis on personal uniqueness and the pursuit of self-interest that helps to deal with coping in a majority-dominated social world” (p. 360; see also Jones, 1997). In contrast, the findings that Latinos in the United States were higher on COL but the same on IND as European Americans, and that some Latinos outside the U.S. (e.g., in Puerto Rico) were higher on both IND and COL than European Americans, were unexpected. As Oyserman et al. state, these results suggest that current beliefs about European Americans being the “gold standard” for individualism may be incorrect. This possibility should not, however, overshadow the discovery that Latinos both inside and outside the U.S. are more collectivistic than European Americans and, therefore, that future research—including leisure research—must take this into account.

In addition to Oyserman et al.’s (2001) five caveats, we propose a sixth: that is, that their findings may be limited to some extent because Asian and Latino Americans’ ethnic and cultural identity levels were not taken into account. According to Gudykunst (2001), ethnic identity refers to a person’s knowledge of membership in his or her ethnic group and the significance he or she attaches to that membership, while cultural identity refers to a person’s knowledge of membership in the mainstream culture and the significance he or she attaches to that membership. Based on a study of Asian Americans, Gudykunst found, as he expected, that ethnic identity strength had a positive effect on the interdependent self-construal but had no effect on the independent self-construal, and that cultural identity strength had a positive effect on the independent self-construal. Unexpectedly, however, he found that cultural identity strength also had a positive effect on the interdependent self-construal, suggesting, “that Asian Americans with strong cul-

1Due to space limitations this article focuses on the theoretical and practical implications associated with interdependence. Clearly, however, the finding that African Americans may be more independent than European Americans has important implications for leisure theory and practice as well. Thus, we strongly recommend that research on this topic also be conducted in the future.
tural identities are more collectivistic than those with weak identities” (p. 116). Gudykunst believes this result may have been due to the large percentage of first-generation immigrants in his sample and, in the same way African Americans may have became more independent because of racial prejudice, Asian Americans may have maintained their interdependence (see also Portes & Rumbaut, 1990).

Oyserman et al.’s (2002) meta-analysis also examined the effect individualism and collectivism had on various psychological functions, including self-concept and self-esteem, well-being, and relationality. Once again, due to space limitations, we briefly summarize the key findings and encourage interested readers to peruse the original article. First, based on 12 cross-national studies, primarily between Japanese and European American/Canadian undergraduate students, Oyserman et al. conclude that, “different forces operate in the function and maintenance of self-esteem for Japanese as compared with Americans (and Canadians)” (p. 32). In one of the studies they cite, for example, Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkit (1997) found that European American undergraduate students rated success situations as being more relevant to self-esteem than failure situations, while the opposite was true for Japanese students. Similarly, in another cited study, Kwan, Bond, and Singelis (1997) found that self-esteem contributed more to life-satisfaction for U.S. students, while relationship harmony contributed more to life-satisfaction for Hong Kong students. Life-satisfaction is often associated with well-being, and in the case of the latter, Oyserman et al. state that, “. . .failure to attain culturally valued goals does seem to dampen well-being. Thus, putting aside the question of whether IND or COL has a main effect influence on well-being, researchers may be able to more fruitfully examine the influence of IND and COL on the processes by which well-being is constructed and maintained” (p. 43). Finally, in regard to relationality, Oyserman et al. stated,

Perhaps the most surprising finding from this body of research is that relationality and family orientation did not emerge as closely linked to COL. Americans see themselves as choosing to be close to their family but not obligated to them. Similarly, Americans reported feeling close to members of their groups, enjoying being with them, and seeking other’s advice. In that sense, Americans are relational but not necessarily collectivists. . . . Thus, we speculate that when researchers assess duty to in-groups or preserving in-group harmony on the one hand and feeling close to members of one’s groups on the other hand, group differences will emerge. When both elements are included in the same measure, it is impossible to assess existing differences in a meaningful way. (p. 43)

The conceptual and methodological issues raised in this quotation are clearly important and, therefore, we will return to them in the final section of this article.

Self-Construal, Self-Determination Theory, and Intrinsic Motivation

Unfortunately, Oyserman et al.’s (2002) otherwise excellent examination of how individualism and collectivism affect various psychological functions
does not mention how these two types of self-construal influence intrinsic motivation—an unfortunate oversight as intrinsic motivation is an often-identified element in many leisure theories. Thus, in the next section we describe: (a) what intrinsic motivation is and how it is facilitated, using Deci and Ryan’s (1985) well known self-determination theory (SDT); (b) findings from recent psychology studies that suggest that self-construal may affect intrinsic motivation; and (c) some key leisure theories that include intrinsic motivation, and what the implications of the above may be for leisure theory specifically, and leisure studies generally.

According to Ryan and Deci (2000), “extrinsic motivation refers to the performance of an activity in order to attain some separable outcome and, thus, contrasts with intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing an activity for the inherent satisfaction of the activity itself” (p. 71). Deci and Ryan (2000) also hold that “intrinsic motivation will be facilitated by conditions that conduce toward psychological need satisfaction, whereas undermining of intrinsic motivation will result when conditions tend to thwart need satisfaction” (p. 233); and that there are three fundamental needs people want satisfied, including: (a) competence; (b) relatedness (i.e., “the desire to feel connected to others—to love and care, and be loved and cared for;” p. 231); and (c) autonomy (i.e., the “desire to self-organize experience and behavior and to have activity be concordant with one’s integrated sense of self;” p. 231). There are two important points that must be made concerning these needs. First, the word “self-organize” in the definition of autonomy connotes personal choice, and this interpretation is supported by scale items used to measure this need (e.g., “Free to do things my own way”; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001). Thus, for the purpose of clarity, we will hereafter refer to SDT’s conceptualization of autonomy using the phrase autonomy/personal choice, and this interpretation is supported by scale items used to measure this need (e.g., “Free to do things my own way”; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001). Thus, for the purpose of clarity, we will hereafter refer to SDT’s conceptualization of autonomy using the phrase autonomy/personal choice. Second, according to SDT, the facilitative effect satisfying these needs has on intrinsic motivation varies, since “autonomy is essential to intrinsic motivation” (Deci & Ryan, p. 234), while “relatedness also plays a role, albeit a more distal one, in the maintenance of intrinsic motivation” (p. 235). Competence apparently falls somewhere in-between, although this is somewhat unclear as Deci and Ryan also state in the same article that, in order for intrinsically motivated behaviors “to be maintained, they require satisfaction of the needs for autonomy and competence” (p. 233).

Recent cross-cultural research has challenged some of these propositions, however. For example, Fiske et al. (1998) contend that while satisfying the need for autonomy/personal choice can foster intrinsic motivation (as SDT holds), it may do so mainly for independent selves. In contrast, for interdependent selves, satisfying the need for relatedness is more likely to facilitate intrinsic motivation. Cross-cultural studies on the importance of these needs, as well as the effect satisfying them has on intrinsic motivation, support the above. In regard to the former, Sheldon et al. (2001) had undergraduate students in the U.S. and South Korea rate the importance of 10 fundamental psychological needs, including self-esteem, pleasure-stimulation, and, from SDT, autonomy/personal choice, competence, and
relatedness. They found that the American students rated self-esteem the highest, followed by relatedness, autonomy/personal choice, and competence (with no significant differences among these last three needs), while South Koreans students rated relatedness the highest, followed by self-esteem, and then by autonomy/personal choice, competence, and pleasure-stimulation (with no significant differences among these last three needs). In regard to the latter, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) discovered that while Anglo American children were intrinsically motivated the most when they personally chose aspects of a puzzle experiment, Chinese and Japanese children were intrinsically motivated the most when they were told that an in-group member (i.e., their mothers) had chosen for them. This finding led them to conclude that, “the provision of individual choice seems to be more crucial to American independent selves, for whom the act of making a personal choice offers not only an opportunity to express and receive one’s personal preference, but also a chance to establish one’s unique self-identity” (p. 363). Fiske et al. (1998) came to the same conclusion, but they used an everyday leisure activity—visiting a coffee house—to illustrate their point:

will you have caf or decaf? Swiss water process or chemical decaffeination? large, medium, or small? Columbian, Ethiopian, hazelnut, vanilla, chocolate raspberry, or house blend? organic or regular? espresso, French roast, or light? cinnamon, chocolate, or nutmeg on top? cream, milk, or non-dairy whitener? brown sugar, refined sugar, aspartame, or saccharin? for here or to go? plastic or paper bag? cash, debit card, or charge? Choosing involves knowing, communicating, and realizing one’s own preferences or attitudes; consequently, choice allows people to manifest their individuality, to express themselves, and to be active agents who control their own destinies. (p. 921)

Doi (1971), a Japanese psychologist, describes a similar leisure experience he had when he was a graduate student in the United States, but his interpretation is noteworthy because it is illustrative of an interdependent perspective. After being asked by his host what he wanted to drink before dinner, during dinner, and after dinner, Doi says he “soon realized that this was only the American’s way of showing politeness to his guest, but in my own mind I had a strong feeling that I couldn’t care less. What a lot of trivial choices they were obliging one to make—I sometimes felt—almost as though they were doing it to reassure themselves of their own freedom” (p. 12). If Doi is indifferent (if not mildly irritated) by personal choice making, other Japanese collectivists have reported that, compared with Australian individualists, personal decision making is more stressful and it is something that should be avoided (Radford, Mann, Ohta, & Nakane, 1993). Potentially, for interdependent selves, not making a choice by oneself reduces the likelihood of adversely affecting significant others—a proposition consistent with Kitayama et al.’s (2000) finding that the second most frequent emotion reported by Japanese was feeling afraid of causing trouble to others. Conversely, providing significant others with too much personal choice may also be undesirable, as Trommsdorff (1985) found that “Japanese adolescents even feel
rejected by their parents when they experience only little parental control and a broader range of autonomy" (p. 238).

Iyengar and Lepper (1999) also concluded that, for Asian American interdependent selves, "having choices made by relevant in-group members instead of making their own choices seems consistently more intrinsically motivating, presumably because it provides a greater opportunity to promote harmony and to fulfill the goal of belonging to the group" (p. 363). Unfortunately, Iyengar and Lepper do not discuss how this process may actually occur, although they do rectify this oversight in a later review article (Iyengar & Lepper, 2002) when they state that, "for members of interdependent cultures, it is not the exercise of choice that is necessary for intrinsic motivation but the perception of themselves as having fulfilled their duties and obligations toward their reference groups" (p. 77). There is some support for their proposition. Bontempo, Lobel, and Triandis (1990) found that in Brazilian culture collectivism often resulted in people feeling good about doing what was normatively required of them. Similarly, in Chinese culture, bu fu hou wang (i.e., to live up to others’ expectations) “is aspired to and cherished” (Gao, 1998, p. 165), and conforming to role expectations is seen as a sign of strength and maturity (Wong & Ahuvia, 1998).

The aforementioned explanation is consistent with the Confucian ideals that underlie some East Asian cultures even today (albeit to a lesser degree than they once did). Rosemont (2000), for example, believes that Confucius would insist that we “can only become truly ‘free’ when we want to fulfill our obligations, when we want to help others (be benefactors), and [when we] enjoy being helped by others (as beneficiaries)” (p. 195). This quotation suggests that, in addition to role-fulfillment, Iyengar and Lepper’s (1999) results could also be explained in terms of the Chinese concept of gan qing. According to Gao (1996) gan qing “as an emotional concept, conveys a sense of interdependency. For the Chinese, emotional love is mediated through helping and caring for one another” (p. 90) rather than through verbal expression. Markus and Kitayama (1991) provide an excellent example of how pei yang gan qing (i.e., “to nurture feelings”; Gao, 1996) could occur between two interdependent selves, and what role in-group member choice would play in this process (and, we infer, how intrinsic motivation could subsequently result). For comparative purposes, they also describe how the same leisure event would look if two independent selves were involved, and what role personal choice would play (and, we once again infer, how intrinsic motivation could subsequently result). Following Markus and Kitayama’s lead, we report the independent self-construal example first:

Imagine that one has a friend over for lunch and has decided to make a sandwich for him. [If both people have independent selves] the conversation might be: “Hey, Tom, what do you want in your sandwich? I have turkey, salami, and cheese.” Tom responds, “Oh, I like turkey.” Note that the friend is given a choice because the host assumes that the friend has a right, if not a duty, to make a choice reflecting his inner attributes, such as preferences or desires.
And the friend makes his choice exactly because of the belief in the same assumption. (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 229)

In contrast, if both people have interdependent selves, the conversation would be: “Hey, Tomio, I made you a turkey sandwich because I remember that last week you said you like turkey more than beef.” And Tomio will respond, ‘Oh, thank you, I really like turkey.’” (p. 229). In this case,

it is the responsibility of the host to be able to “read” the mind of the friend and offer what the host perceives to be the best for the friend. And the duty of the guest, on the other hand, is to receive the favor with grace and to be prepared to return the favor in the near future, if not right at the next moment. (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 229)

Thus, Iyengar and Lepper’s finding that for interdependent selves intrinsic motivation is facilitated by satisfying the superordinate need for relatedness may become comprehensible once the processes of role-fulfilment and, based on the Chinese concept of *pei yang gan qing* what we hereafter refer to as relationship nurturance, are understood.

Culture and self-construal may not only affect the need for relatedness, but also the need for competence. For example, Heine, Kitayama, Lehman, Takata, and Ide (as cited in Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999) found that, while Canadians (i.e., independent selves) persisted significantly longer on a second creativity test after having been told that they had successfully completed an earlier test, Japanese (i.e., interdependent selves) persisted significantly longer on the second test after they had been told that they had *failed* the first test. In interpreting these results, Heine et al. state that in interdependent cultures such as Japan, “the individual has neither the liberty nor the inclination to inflate his or her perceptions of competence. . . . [because] doing so likely would only serve to alienate the individual from others” (p. 771). Thus, for interdependent selves, it is less “being” good that is important than the process of “becoming” better (Heine et al.), since it is the latter that is most likely to lead to the need for relatedness being satisfied (see also Triandis, 1995).

In conclusion, SDT has come under scrutiny due to: (a) the need for autonomy being conceived of only in terms of personal choice (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; 2002); (b) the relative importance attributed to the need for autonomy/personal choice and the relative unimportance attributed to the need for relatedness (Andersen, Chen, & Carter, 2000; Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; 2002); and (c) the relative importance attributed to the need for competence and the relative unimportance attributed to effort (Heine et al., 1999). It must be noted, however, that since Iyengar and Lepper’s findings were published, Deci and Ryan have begun to address some of these issues. For example, Deci and Ryan (2000) have since stated that, in contrast with people in an individualistic culture, “in a collectivist culture, people may resonate to group norms so acting in accord with them might lead to them to experience relatedness and autonomy insofar as they fully internalized the collectivist values of their culture” (p. 246). Although this statement suggests
that Deci and Ryan now believe that autonomy could vary cross-culturally, it is worth adding that the SDT definition of autonomy we cited earlier (i.e., the "desire to self-organize experience and behavior. . . .", p. 231), is from the very same article. In spite of this apparent contradiction, we still believe that Deci and Ryan's statement represents an important step in recognizing that culture and self-construal do affect choice and relatedness—and, it follows, how satisfying these needs subsequently facilitates intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, we believe their statement also indicates that theoretical frameworks that involve intrinsic motivation—including those in leisure studies—must begin to take self-construal and its effects into account.2

Self-Construal and Leisure Theory

Although the ancient Greeks did not develop any leisure theories per se, they did identify two variables—intrinsic motivation and freedom/personal choice—that are part of many modern leisure theories. DeGrazia (1962/1994), for example, holds that, for Aristotle, "leisure is a state of being in which activity is performed for its own sake or as its own end" (p. 15). Kelly (1996) agrees, but based on his reading of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, he adds that, "leisure is not just intrinsic pleasure, but involves the exercise of choice using rational principles" (p. 127). One of the earliest contemporary theories to include these two variables is Neulinger's (1981) leisure paradigm. According to Neulinger, "the primary defining criterion of leisure is freedom, or to be more specific, perceived freedom. By this we mean a state in which the person feels that what he/she is doing is done by choice and because one wants to do it" (p. 15). The second dimension in his leisure paradigm is motivation, which can be further subdivided depending on whether the source of satisfaction is the activity itself (i.e., intrinsic motivation), a payoff from the activity (i.e., extrinsic motivation), or both. Perceived freedom and intrinsic motivation, Neulinger adds, "are not characteristics of the leisure experience, but rather are the conditions necessary to bring that experience about" (p. 182). Similarly, Tinsley and Tinsley (1986) propose that in order for a leisure experience to occur, an individual must perceive that his or her participation in an activity is freely chosen and that the benefits of participating in the activity are derived from factors intrinsic to the activity (p. 15). Iso-Ahola (1999), in contrast, holds that "a sense of freedom—autonomy—is the central defining characteristic of leisure" (p. 36), but also, consistent with SDT, that "freedom of choice is a necessary condition

2One reviewer, in fact, wondered whether the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation might not need to be radically redefined for interdependent selves. In terms of the former, based in part on a recent study that examined the Chinese experience of rumi (Walker & Deng, 2003, 2004), we believe that there is a reasonable level of support for intrinsic motivation as it is currently conceptualized. In terms of the latter, however, we too are somewhat concerned about the appropriateness of current conceptualizations of extrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci and Ryan's, 1985, self-determination theory) for interdependent selves and, therefore, we strongly recommend that future research be conducted on this topic.
[italics added] for intrinsic motivation in general and for intrinsically motivated leisure in particular" (p. 44). Examination of these leisure theories indicates that, first, freedom or freedom of choice generally means that the individual is free to choose, and second, that intrinsic motivation, either in conjunction with, or as a consequence of, personal choice, is often thought to affect leisure. As we have already reported, however, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) found that while independent selves preferred personal choice, interdependent selves preferred in-group member choice. Thus, leisure theories such as those described above should be re-evaluated and, possibly, redesigned so that they include both types of choice.

Further examination of Iso-Ahola’s (1999) leisure theory indicates that he holds, again as does SDT, that satisfying the need for competence also facilitates intrinsically motivated leisure. As reported earlier, however, Heine et al.’s (1999) research suggests that this may be most true of independent selves, while for interdependent selves intrinsic motivation is fostered more by effort. This finding provides further support for re-evaluating and, possibly, redesigning Iso-Ahola’s leisure model.3

The effect social interaction has on leisure, either in conjunction with, or in opposition to, intrinsic motivation, has also been recognized in some leisure theories. Iso-Ahola (1999), for example, agrees with SDT’s contention that satisfying the need for relatedness can facilitate intrinsic motivation, although he is—as are Deci and Ryan (2000)—quick to point out the negative aspects of social interaction and the positive aspects of being alone. In contrast with this causal model, Kelly (1978) views social interaction and the intrinsic aspect of activities as endpoints on a meaning continuum. Kelly’s leisure paradigm also includes a second dimension, freedom of choice, ranging from low to high (although he dichotomizes it for the sake of simplicity). Four primary kinds of leisure are thus possible, including: (a) unconditional leisure (i.e., high freedom and activity-intrinsic meaning); (b) recuperative leisure (i.e., low freedom and activity-intrinsic meaning); (c) relational leisure (i.e., high freedom and social-focused meaning); and (d) role-determined leisure (i.e., low freedom and social-focused meaning). For interdependent selves, the advantages of a leisure theory that recognizes the importance of the social aspect of leisure are evident. However, it should be noted that Kelly’s theory might not be as useful as initially thought since it does not differentiate between personal choice and in-group member choice, nor does it recognize how role-fulfillment and relationship nurturance could be intrinsically motivating for interdependent selves. It is important to add, however, that Kelly (1999) has subsequently recognized that such alternative kinds of leisure could exist, as he has since stated that, “even the fundamental dimension of ‘freedom’ will require a recasting in cultures in which social solidarity takes precedence over individual development” (p. 62).

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3Interestingly, Tinsley and Tinsley’s (1986) leisure theory does identify effort, or what they call commitment, as a factor that affects leisure.
In conclusion, leisure theorists often state that the key factor affecting intrinsic motivation is freedom or, more accurately, personal choice—and, in the case of independent selves we would agree. Similarly, competence is sometimes seen as a secondary variable affecting intrinsic motivation—and, once again, in the case of independent selves, we would agree. But for interdependent selves the key factor may be relatedness—possibly in terms of either role-fulfillment, or relationship nurturance, or both—with other variables (e.g., effort, in-group member choice) that help to satisfy this superordinate need playing supportive roles. We want to make clear, however, that there are also other ways interdependent selves may experience intrinsic motivation—although they likely occur less often. In Chinese culture, for example, annual festivals, dinner parties, and spectator sports are often described as being renao (i.e., noisy and exciting; De Mente, 2000). According to Gabrenya and Hwang (1996), “renao facilitates social interaction somewhat outside of normal social hierarchies and networks, thereby releasing people from the usual constraints inherent in Chinese society” (p. 314). In this way interdependent selves may experience intrinsic motivation in a more independent manner, one that is consistent with the contemporary, individualistic, leisure theories discussed earlier. Similarly, we would also expect independent selves to sometimes engage in leisure activities that are congruent with their interdependent selves. (Possibly, for example, by being a group member on an extended wilderness trip, or by being a “role” player on a sports team.) Thus, future theories must not only be able to explain how leisure is experienced by interdependent selves, but also how interdependent selves experience leisure in terms of independence, and how independent selves experience leisure in terms of interdependence.

Before new leisure theories are developed, it would worthwhile to understand why leisure studies has focused on the relationship between personal choice and intrinsic motivation in the past. Although it could simply be a by-product of there being “no comprehensive social psychology of cultural differences in leisure” (Mannell & Kleiber, 1997, p. 27), it could also be a result of leisure largely being studied in independent cultures and by highly independent selves. We began this section, for example, by describing how personal choice was a key component of the ancient Greek view of leisure. According to Nisbett (2003) and colleagues (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Nrenzayan, 2001), however, the Greeks were not only among the most independent of all ancient people, but also, if not the world’s first individualistic culture, its second (after the Hebrews). Triandis (1995) concurs, although he adds that this type of self-construal was likely limited to a select few (i.e., aristocratic males, such as Aristotle). Thus, the ancient Greek view of leisure must be seen in context—and this contextualization requires that

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4As Nisbett et al. (2001) note, it should not be assumed that Western societies have always been individualistic. During feudal times, for example, Europe was likely highly collectivistic. For more on how the self’s structure has changed over time, see Baumeister (1987) and Triandis (1995).
the type of culture it was formed in, and the type of selves who formed it, be taken into account.

Contemporary views of leisure must be contextualized in the same way. Although it would be interesting to speculate on the type of selves the leisure theorists we cited earlier have, a more practical approach is to examine academicians in general. For example, based on Triandis and Singelis' (cited in Triandis, 1995) and others' (Sinha et al., 2001) findings that education has a positive effect on the independent self-construal, and recognizing that academicians typically have the highest level of education possible, it follows therefore that we are likely among the most independent of selves. The academic culture we exist in is also highly independent, as evidenced by how graduate students are trained and how faculty members are recognized and rewarded (Bennett, 2000). As well, according to the United States Department of Labor (2002), postsecondary teachers "are free to decide when and where they will work, and how much time to devote to course preparation, grading, study, research, graduate student supervision, and other activities" (p. 198). Of course, for academicians, personal choice is not really about when, where, or how much, but rather about what—that is, being free to choose what we teach in our classes and what we conduct research on outside of them. Ultimately, this autonomy is the reason many of us became and remain academicians (Raelin, 2003). Thus, although Mills' (1959) description of the scholarly life may be dated in terms of gender, it is still accurate in terms of independence and personal choice:

Scholarship is a choice of how to live as well as a choice of career; whether he knows it or not, the intellectual workman forms his own self as he works toward perfection of his craft; to realize his own potentialities, and any opportunities that come his way, he constructs a character which has as its core the qualities of the good workman. (p. 196)

Finally, as much as our students disagree, universities are part of the "real" world. Consequently, universities reflect, represent, and reproduce the cultures that encompass them. In the case of America and Canada, this means that individualism predominates.

Unfortunately, American and Canadian cultures' effect on the independent self-construal and the independent self-construal's effect on personal choice, goes largely unnoticed. In the United States, for example:

This culturally-shared idea of the individual self is a pervasive, taken-for-granted assumption that saturates all of lived experience. It is held in place by language, by the mundane rituals and social practices of daily life, by the foundational texts like the Declaration Independence and the Bill of Rights, and by virtually all social institutions including the legal system and the media. (Markus et al., 1996, p. 861)

Schooler (1996), a sociologist, argues that psychological research has overlooked how social structural factors could also affect self-construal. For more on how one such factor, social class, could be particularly relevant in the case of academicians, see Walker and Kiecolt (1995).
This taken-for-grantedness was reinforced for us when we read the Associate Editor's remarks on an earlier version of this article. The AE wrote: “A few reviewer comments suggest they believe that interdependent self construal is imposed by culture on eastern populations while independent self construal is more of a choice [italics added].” Our point here is not to criticize either the AE or the reviewers, but instead to illustrate how easy it is to be unaware of the Kulturbrille (i.e., “cultural glasses”; Ichheiser, 1970) we all—including leisure scholars—sometimes wear.

In conclusion, while we concur with Floyd (1998) and Searle’s (2000) call for the development of new leisure theories, we also strongly believe that the concept, and effects, of self-construal must be recognized and incorporated into these theoretical frameworks. We are also cognizant, however, of Kelly’s (2000) critique of theory-based research that ignores how resource distribution, access, and exclusion can affect people’s everyday life circumstances, and that fails to answer the question “Why is this important?” (p. 77). In order to forestall these concerns, in the next section we discuss indirect institutional discrimination (Feagin & Eckberg, 1980), before we describe—using benefits based programming (Rossman & Schlatter, 2000) as an exemplar—what some of the implications of not incorporating self-construal into leisure practice might be.

Self-Construal and Leisure Practice

Although we believe there are numerous implications for leisure practice, clearly the most important is the possibility that leisure service agencies and practitioners who do not recognize that leisure may be different for interdependent selves may be committing indirect institutional discrimination. Indirect institutional discrimination occurs when “organizationally or community prescribed practices, motivated by neither prejudice nor intent to harm that nevertheless have a negative and differential impact on members of a subordinate group” (Feagin & Eckberg, 1980, p. 12). According to Feagin and Eckberg, an example of this type of discrimination would be a medical school that unintentionally ignores that “minority students from different subcultural backgrounds have different values in regard to interpersonal relations and authority [than non-minority students]” (p. 13). Although this example begs the question—“How easy would it be to replace medical school with leisure service agency, minority students with interdependent recreationists, and non-minority students with independent recreationists?”—for the time being at least this query must remain unanswered. However, Scott (2000) does provide some insight into how leisure service agency practices and practitioner beliefs could result in this type of discrimination occurring. Scott states that disenfranchised group members may experience indirect institutional discrimination when a leisure service agency has an entrepreneurial approach to service delivery, a service quality perspective that focuses on maintaining a loyal customer base, a narrow conception of recreation need, or an insufficiently diverse workforce. Although
all four of these factors could be implicated, we believe that there may be other systemic ways indirect institutional discrimination may influence interdependent selves in Canada and the United States. In order to illustrate how this could occur in an everyday recreation practice; to show what negative impacts could subsequently result; and to outline the practical implications this may have for leisure service agencies and practitioners, we use benefits based programming (BBP; Rossman & Schlatter, 2000) as an exemplar.

According to Driver and Bruns (1999), the benefits approach to leisure is a broad philosophical framework which defines positive and negative consequences of delivering leisure services “with the objective being to optimize net benefits—or to add as much value as possible” (p. 350). There are two important reasons for the benefits approach to leisure philosophy: first, to increase political parity of leisure services, and second, to refocus attention on the contributions of recreation and leisure to its historical contributions of aiding human welfare (Driver & Bruns, 1999). As such, benefits-based management (Allen, 1996), benefits based repositioning (Crompton & Witt, 1997), and benefits based programming (Rossman & Schlatter, 2000) are all specialized uses of the benefits approach to leisure framework (B. L. Driver, personal communication, March 10, 2003).

Benefits based programming is an outcome-oriented approach that focuses the leisure practitioners’ efforts on producing identified benefits as a result of their participation in recreation and leisure programs (Rossman & Schlatter, 2000). Building upon the academic work of benefits-based researchers and practitioners (e.g., Allen & McGovern, 1997; Forest, 1999), Rossman and Schlatter propose a four-component BBP model, which includes:

1. Target social issues or problems: Activities address protective factors (e.g., coping, internal expectations, personal responsibility, self-efficacy).
2. Activity components: Write performance objectives, identify activities to achieve goals and objectives, process activities with recreation participants, and monitor the achievement of objectives.
3. Benefits outcome: Summarize the achievement of target goals leading to increased personal resiliency (e.g., self-efficacy).
4. Benefits based awareness: Communicate the successes (outcomes) to the general public, funding sources, and stakeholders.

A critical analysis of Rossman and Schlatter’s (2000) BBP model underscores how benefits are premised upon intrinsic motivation of people who have independent self-construals. That is, although Rossman and Schlatter clearly communicate that target issues are not limited, their examples are based on people with independent self-construals (e.g., internal expectations, personal responsibility, self-efficacy). To provide potential benefits for people with interdependent self-construals, leisure practitioners using BBP should provide target issues that are premised upon the values of interdependent selves. To further augment the difference between target issues and
Based on the above, we offer three practical implications for leisure service agencies and practitioners. First, it is paramount that leisure professionals understand culture, self-construal, and intrinsic motivation before following the benefits approach to leisure philosophy or implementing the specialized use of BBP. Providing independent self-construal “benefits” for people who have interdependent self-construals can have a myriad of negative effects (e.g., cognitive/cultural dissonance, leisure constraint, non-participation). In short, leisure practitioners may unknowingly harm clients instead of helping them experience the benefits of leisure. Dieser (2002), for example, underscores how therapeutic recreation practice based on the benefit of developing an independent leisure lifestyle for a client who embraced collectivistic values (i.e., an interdependent self-construal) resulted in the problematic consequence of the client leaving a treatment program. Based on this type of result, Dieser, Magnuson, and Scholl (in press) have recently argued for a critical thinking extension to the specialized use of BBP in therapeutic recreation services. To this end, B. L. Driver (personal communication, March 10, 2003) highlighted how benefits-based management (within the benefits approach to leisure paradigm; Driver & Bruns, 1999) could be used to articulate outcomes to maintain or develop ethnic identities through leisure services (e.g., interdependency, group orientation). However, a prerequisite for this is that leisure practitioners understand how beneficial outcomes may vary both within and between members of different cultural groups.

Second, and closely related to the first recommendation, when using a BBP model leisure practitioners need to be aware of the language they use when communicating the benefits of leisure to the general public, funding sources, and stakeholders (see the last component—benefits based awareness—of Rossman & Schlatter’s, 2000, BBP model). Communication of independent self-construal values (e.g., self-efficacy, internal locus of control, personal choice) associated with European North American culture (Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995) further reinforces the

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<td>In-group member choice</td>
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<tr>
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<td>External expectations</td>
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TABLE 1
Differences Between Target Issues and Benefits of Intrinsic Motivation for People with Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals

benefits of intrinsic motivation of independent and interdependent selves, Table 1 has been developed:

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dominant discourse of independent selves. In turn, this can reinforce dom-
inant values and further marginalize people from diverse and minority back-
grounds—such as those with interdependent self-construals. As Whitson re-
minds us, “we have stopped talking in a serious way about human needs,
and especially about the collective caring about the needs of strangers that
allows us to call ourselves a community” (p. 167). Thus, if leisure practitio-
ners are to provide benefits for people, they must reflect on the language they
use when articulating the benefits of leisure to the general public, funding
sources, and stakeholders.

Third, it is critical that leisure practitioners correctly understand the
benefits approach to leisure philosophy (Driver, 2002), especially the under-
lying proposition that leisure services can result in both positive and negative
outcomes, and that the primary objective is to optimize net and positive
benefits (Driver & Bruns, 1999). Driver (1994, as cited in Driver & Burns,
1999), for example, has highlighted that the benefits approach to leisure can
impact individuals, groups, the environment, and the economy both posi-
tively and negatively. Thus, the primary focus must be maximizing positive
benefits while recognizing and attempting to limit negative impacts of leisure
services. For example, in order to maximize net benefits, a social impact
assessment (Bryan, 1997; Burdge, 1995) can be implemented prior to the
construction of a recreation/sport event or facility to predict, in advance,
the positive and negative impacts on a community. Likewise, cross-cultural
collaborative natural resource partnerships (Dieser & Ewert, 2002) can in-
crease net benefits to natural resource recreation opportunities.

Finally, although benefits based programming in its current configura-
tion may be most appropriate for independent selves, it must be reiterated
that interdependent selves are also independent (albeit lesser so) and, there-
fore, they too could benefit from BBP to some degree. Furthermore, BBP
could be advantageous for interdependent selves who have recently moved
to an individualistic society and who want to learn more about the main-
stream culture. In spite of these positive aspects, however, in order for BBP
to be fully benefit and beneficiary inclusive, it must be reconfigured such
that the interdependent self-construal is both included and incorporated. If
this change occurs, then independent selves’ interdependent needs and in-
terdependent selves’ needs will be positively impacted. If it does not, then
independent selves will not benefit as much as they could, while interde-
pendent selves will not benefit as much as they should. The difference is that
interdependent selves—due neither to a practitioner’s prejudice nor to his
or her intent to harm—may experience a negative and differential impact
(i.e., indirect institutional discrimination; Feagin & Eckberg, 1980).

6 Balanced accounts of the costs and benefits that can accrue from this kind of limited assimil-
ation/acculturation can be found in Brubaker (2001) and Portes and Rumbaut (1990). For
more on this learning process in university settings, such as when interdependent students in-
teract with independent professors, see Kim (2002) and Tweed and Lehman (2002).
Conceptual and Methodological Concerns and Conclusion

Before we conclude we want to make clear that the concept of self-construal is still evolving and, therefore, there are limitations associated with it. In an earlier section we noted, for example, that Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) original conceptualization may have been too broad, and, consequently, self-construal may have more than two dimensions (i.e., independence and interdependence). This possibility has led to the development of various alternative designs, two of which we will mention briefly. First, Kashima and Hardie (2000) distinguish among individual, collective, and relational aspects of the self and, based on this, they propose a three-dimensional model. In contrast, Triandis (1995) has put forth a model of the self which includes egalitarianism and hierarchy as well as individualism and collectivism, and that results in a four-dimensional model (i.e., horizontal individualism, vertical individualism, horizontal collectivism, and vertical collectivism). As with Markus and Kitayama’s original conceptualization, both of these models recognize that individuals, and the cultures that encompass them, are multi-dimensional but that some dimensions are predominant over others. Triandis, for example, describes himself as being 60% individualist (37% horizontal, 23% vertical) and 40% collectivist (27% horizontal, 13% vertical), while, at the cultural level, his research indicates that Chinese are approximately 70% collectivist (40% horizontal, 30% vertical) and 30% individualist (15% horizontal, 15% vertical). The previous point is important because, by not acknowledging that within-culture differences exist, the result may be “oversimplification of the other” (Gramann & Allison, 1999). On the other hand, by not acknowledging that between-culture similarities also exist—often because they are less “interesting” (Wheeler, Reis, & Bond, 1989)—the result may be equally deleterious. Finally, because how something is conceptualized affects how it is subsequently operationalized (Neulinger, 1981), we recommend that leisure researchers who intend to measure independence and interdependence peruse a recent review of self-construal scales (Levine et al., 2003), as well as the invited responses to this review. We also recommend they examine Kashima and Hardie’s scale (which is included in their article as an appendix) and Triandis’ scales (which are included in his book’s appendix; see also Soh & Leong, 2002, and Triandis & Gelfand, 1998, in regard to these scales’ validity).

In conclusion, as evidenced by this article’s existence we strongly believe that the concept of self-construal could contribute to both leisure theory and practice. We also believe, however, that because leisure likely allows people—indeed and interdependent selves alike—the greatest opportunity to satisfy their needs, leisure studies could make an important contribution to the body of knowledge related to culture, self-construal, and intrinsic motivation. Thus, while leisure research on the relationships among these variables is currently rare, leisure researchers have the potential to more than amend for this paucity in the future. The choice is ours.
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