"Whoa Versus Go!"
A Rejoinder to Mannell and Caldwell

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As the reader is likely aware, the title of this rejoinder refers to Linda Caldwell's (2005) comment that our conceptualization of culture and self-construal (Walker, Deng, & Dieser, 2005) "is far too complex to [be] wholeheartedly endorse[d] as the next defining moment of leisure research and practice" and, therefore, that "Whoa!" must be exclaimed. Frankly, we agree with her assessment in many ways: our proposal is complicated; the ideas that underlie it are not fully developed; the measures that are recommended require refinement; and, in terms of being the next "big damn deal" in recreation and leisure studies, it is up to the field to decide if it sets the predicate. Having said this, we remain convinced that "Go!" rather than "Whoa!" is the correct exclamation, and we interpret Roger Mannell's (2005) comments to be largely in concurrence. In the following pages we address more fully the issues Mannell and Caldwell raise, but before we do so we provide a brief "biography" of our idea.

In 1994, while a doctoral student at Virginia Tech, the lead author (Gordon Walker) first read Markus and Kitayama's (1991) article on culture and self-construal as part of a sociological social psychology (SSP) course. Although Markus and Kitayama's propositions provided the framework for a class essay on culture, self-construal, and leisure, it wasn't until after becoming a faculty member and writing my first Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant proposal that I was able to develop my ideas more fully. The grant reviewers' comments, along with the arrival of two new doctoral students, allowed me to further refine these ideas; with Rod Dieser providing needed commentary on the practical and professional aspects, and Jinyang Deng describing how independence and interdependence are exemplified in Western and Chinese cultures, respectively. Rod, Jinyang, and I then used this grant proposal as the basis for an abstract
submitted to National Recreation and Park Association Research Symposium, followed by a manuscript submitted to the *Journal of Leisure Research*—the former being evaluated by a coordinator and two reviewers, the latter by an Associate Editor and five reviewers. Thus, 11 years after the idea was originally conceived, and 6 years after serious effort was first expended, a refereed paper on culture, self-construal, and leisure theory and practice was finally published.

Hopefully this biography serves three purposes. First, as Martin and Erber (2003) note, the "behind the scenes" view of what makes an idea initially "click" and how it is subsequently modified is seldom discussed in research articles. Second, as Searle (2000) states, graduate students are usually insufficiently exposed to leisure theory, and this recounting may provide them with some understanding of the important role others (e.g., students, grant reviewers, and journal editors, associate editors, and reviewers) play in its development. Third, and overlooked by Searle in his discussion of why there is so little theory in leisure studies, it illustrates the sheer amount of time it takes to formulate new frameworks. The last is particularly important since, in the numbers-driven kind of institution that universities have become, it often seems to make more sense to produce MPUs (i.e., minimum publishable units; Jackson & Scott, 1999) rather than theoretical pieces that take many years to develop and, in the process, can affect a researcher's ability to meet his or her annual publication "quota" (Jackson, 2003; Shaw, 2003). On the other hand, when a journal format such as the current one is used, this issue is counterbalanced by the opportunity to have one's ideas commented on and challenged by leading researchers such as, in our case, Roger Mannell and Linda Caldwell.

In terms of Roger Mannell's response, we are especially intrigued by his discussion of: (a) Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, Spencer, and Zanna's (in press) three-generation model of cross-cultural psychological research; (b) leisure as an experiential state being universal but also varying in certain observable and predictable ways across cultures; and (c) how our framework could potentially address some scholars' concerns that the social psychology of leisure is too focused on the individual level.

As the reader may remember, the first generation of research was intent on identifying cross-cultural similarities in order to demonstrate the universality of psychological constructs; the second generation of research was intent on identifying culture-specific phenomena in order to demonstrate differences in psychological constructs; and the third generation of research synthesized the two in order to develop a more comprehensive and more realistic view of the effect culture has, and does not have, on psychological functioning (Hoshino-Browne, et al., in press). According to Mannell, our ideas contribute to the social psychological study of leisure because they advance our field to this third generation of thinking. Although pleased by this suggestion we are also puzzled by why leisure scholars in general have remained focused on differences rather than on similarities and differences (there are exceptions; e.g., Stodolska & Yi, 2003). Two potential explanations
for this phenomenon are intentional and unintentional over-attentiveness. The lead author's experience with a previous article on race, ethnicity, and the natural environment (Virden & Walker, 1999) illustrates the latter. During the review process for this article, the Associate Editor criticized our original title “Ethnic/racial differences among meanings given to and preferences for the natural environment” because, as he correctly observed, only a few of our comparisons actually exhibited statistically significant differences. Although the title itself was a relatively minor issue, the AE’s comment sparked an “Aha!” moment, and since this episode we have been acutely aware of the need to protect against being unintentionally over-attentive to differences.\footnote{As it happens, the Associate Editor describes his view of this experience, as well as his concerns about research over-emphasizing leisure differences among ethnic and racial groups generally, elsewhere (Hutchison, 2000).} In contrast with the above, some leisure scholars could be intentionally over-attentive to differences. For example, Terry Eagleton (2003), one of the founders of the British school of literary theory, has posited that postmodern theorists such as Foucault and Derrida not only would “like a world made entirely out of differences” they “think the world is made entirely out of differences” (p. 14). Unfortunately, according to Eagleton, this ontological stance eventually led to the belief that “whatever linked us—whatever was the same—was noxious” (p. 45), and a “fetish of difference” (p. 46) developed. If Eagleton is correct, this occurrence, in conjunction with unintentional over-attentiveness, could help explain why leisure studies has largely not advanced beyond second generation research.

Consequently perhaps, there has been relatively little discussion of how, as Mannell puts it, leisure could be “a culturally universal psychological state and experience” that operates “differently across cultures in understandable and predictable ways” (again, there are exceptions; e.g., Chick, 1998). Mannell too is correct in that we would respond positively to this proposal, as we believe that intrinsic motivation is panhuman but its facilitation varies depending on the type of self-construal a person holds, and that self-construal in turn is affected by one’s culture. Our rationale for supporting this proposition is also based on a complementary study we conducted which examined if, in Chinese culture, there is a phenomenon comparable with the Western concept of leisure as a subjective experience. As we concluded in Walker and Deng (2003/2004):

Many of the properties Mannell and Kleiber (1997) include in their inventory of leisure as a subjective experience are also found when Chinese participants reported their riumi experiences. For example, interest, enthusiasm, and enjoyment were rated as the top three emotions during riumi experiences, a finding consistent with research on leisure as a subjective experience, which often describes the latter in terms of highly positive or intensely pleasant moods (Gunter, 1987). Similarly, riumi experiences were often reported as involving focused attention, a high level of involvement in the activity and, in comparison, a low level of involvement in one’s self. Once again, these experiential qualities are
consistent with those found when leisure as a subjective experience is examined. Two other characteristics of these experiences also appear to be similar, particularly changed perceptions of time, but also perceived competence. Additionally, findings related to other variables (e.g., effort, challenge, intrinsic motivation) which are either associated with leisure as a subjective experience or a related type of experience (e.g., flow, presence, absorption) also lend support to our conclusion that the Chinese experience of rūmī is comparable with the leisure state described by Western researchers. (p. 266)

Having said this, it should be noted that we did find some post experientia differences in our study but, equally important, these results were easily explainable once the participants' Chinese background was taken into account. Based on these study findings, in conjunction with the ideas outlined earlier, we hold that leisure as a psychological experience and state—characterized not only by intrinsic motivation but also by focused attention, changed perception of time, intense feelings of interest and enjoyment, a high level of involvement in the activity and, concurrently, a low level of involvement in one's self—is universal, but that the factors that facilitate it, and the way in which it is subsequently interpreted, can and often does vary across cultures.

Finally, although we feel our framework could address some of concerns that have been raised about the social psychology of leisure being too focused on the individual level, we are less optimistic than Mannell in this regard. On the one hand, as we describe in the biography section, our ideas about culture, self-construal, and leisure originated in a sociological social psychology course and are, consequently, consistent with the micro-macro link (House, 1995) that characterizes this area. On the other hand, we remain struck by a reviewer's comment that: "for all the claims of deconstructing leisure theory embedded in this paper, I think those of a sociological persuasion and many Europe [sic] scholars would find it a predictably North American and perversely psychological approach to cultural analyses." While we agree that the critical and cultural approaches (e.g., critical theory, cultural studies, deconstructionism, poststructuralism, etc.) the reviewer refers to can inform leisure studies, we are concerned that the serious self-reflection now taking place by those firmly in these areas may be being ignored. For example, in April 2003 the editorial board of Critical Inquiry held an "intellectual town meeting" in Chicago to discuss whether the critical and cultural approaches featured in the journal had reached a plateau (Mitchell, 2003). Poovey (2003), in her response, noted that these approaches' accomplishments might have been overstated and, further, rather than continuing to go it alone there was a "need to form alliances with practitioners in the social and natural sciences. The disciplines that come to mind include sociology, psychology (including cognitive psychology), political science, philosophy of science, and ethnography" (f 2). Pavel (2003), in his response, held that the main problem with literary criticism was that it had become too narcissistic, but he also agreed with the editor, W. J. T. Mitchell, that "literary theory has backed off from its revolutionary engagement to become more therapeutic and individualistic" (f 3). In terms of becoming politically
inert, at least one of the invited speakers at a related public symposium seemed to think that it had always been so. The respected African American academic Henry Louis Gates Jr. said that, as far as he could tell: “theory had never directly liberated anyone. ‘Maybe I’m too young,’ he said. ‘I really didn’t see it: the liberation of people of color because of deconstruction or poststructuralism’” (Eakin, 2003, April 19, ¶ 15). Similarly, in terms of becoming increasingly individualistic, Triandis (1995) noted ten years ago that: “though the postmodern philosophers (e.g., Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault) are currently fashionable in the humanities, [philosopher Charles] Taylor rejected them as superindividualists” (p. 23). Regardless of whether these approaches have become or have always been highly individualistic, what is key is that they are now widely recognized as being such; thus, how appropriate they are for conducting leisure research with, or providing recreation opportunities for, interdependent selves is open to question (see also Shweder, 2003; Shweder & Henon, 2003).2

In terms of Caldwell’s response, as stated earlier we agree that there are difficulties with how self-construal is currently conceptualized and operationalized; but we disagree that these are serious flaws that limit the value of this construct for leisure theory and practice. We are also at odds with her comments that: (a) our ideas involve or promote “devilish dualism;” (b) we under-play the importance of identity; (c) our examples of personal choice are trivial; and (d) our discussion of self-construal and intrinsic motivation suffers from “conceptual confusion.” We respond to each of these contentions below.

First, in terms of dualism, we are surprised by Caldwell’s criticism since we clearly state early in our article that: “while cultures may emphasize one [type of self-construal] more than the other, every culture recognizes and legitimates some aspects of both independence and interdependence and, correspondingly, at the person level, ‘there are elements of both independence and interdependence in every self’ (Fiske et al., 1998, p. 925).” We also make this point clear in our section on leisure practice, when we write that: “although benefits based programming in its current configuration may be most appropriate for independent selves, it must be reiterated that interdependent selves are also independent (albeit lesser so) and, therefore, they too could benefit from BBP to some degree.” Additionally, in our concluding section, we describe Triandis’ (1995) four-dimensional model (dualism squared, perhaps?) and specifically mention that he: “describes himself as being 60% individualist (37% horizontal, 23% vertical) and 40% collectivist (27% horizontal, 13% vertical), while, at the cultural level, his research in-

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2 Although some may argue that critical and cultural approaches must be promoted in order to counteract the “pervasiveness” of social psychology (or, more accurately, psychological social psychology) in North American leisure research, we hold that while PSP is still influential it is no longer hegemonic. For example, of the 89 abstracts presented at the 2003 NRPA Leisure Research Symposium only 11 (13%) were submissions to the psychological/social psychological aspects of leisure topical area (W. T. Borrie, personal communication, January 12, 2004).
indicates that Chinese are approximately 70% collectivist (40% horizontal, 30% vertical) and 30% individualist (15% horizontal, 15% vertical).” Thus, while we feel that Caldwell’s charge of dualism is erroneous, we will take this opportunity to state once again that people and cultures are not either independent or interdependent but both.

Second, in terms of under-playing the importance of identity, we do discuss Gudykunst’s (2001) research on ethnic identity, cultural identity, and self-construal, and at this time we refer interested readers to his chapter for an in-depth discussion of these variables and the relationships among them. Caldwell is right, though, in that we did not discuss identity and self-construal in terms of, for example, gender, social class, or religious and environmental identification. This was a deliberate decision based on our belief that it would make an already long and complex discussion even more so. Given a second opportunity, we will happily comply.

Although Markus and Kitayama (1991) focused on culture and self-construal, they did recognize the possibility that independence and interdependence could differ due to gender. Susan Cross was among the first to look at gender and self-construal (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997), and she remains a leader in this area. For example, Cross, Bacon, and Morris (2000) contend that there are two types of interdependent self-construal, one that emphasizes in-group members (and, therefore, is consistent with Markus and Kitayama’s original conceptualization), and a second that emphasizes individual relationships (what Cross and colleagues call the relational-interdependent self-construal or RISC). Research conducted with U.S. undergraduate students led Cross, Bacon, and Morris (p. 805) to state that their:

Studies also supported the hypothesis that women would be more likely to define themselves in terms of their close relationships than would men. The effect sizes for the RISC scale in these studies ranged from fairly small (d = –.17) to moderate (d = –.57). These effect sizes are similar in magnitude to many other gender differences in behavior (Hyde, 1996).

In our original article we also put forth that university professors may be highly independent, and that this could be related to their social class. Based on Wright’s (1978) framework, for example, professors are members of the semiautonomous class, and “they control how they do their work and have at least some control over what they produce” (p. 81). Thus, social class and self-construal may be linked, and we believe that both could influence a person’s leisure (for more on how social class might affect one specific type of leisure activity, wilderness use, see Walker and Kiecolt, 1995).

In addition to gender and social class, religious and environmental identity may also be related to self-construal. Markus and Kitayama (1991) note, for example, that: “religious groups, such as the Quakers, explicitly value and promote interdependence” (p. 228). Building on this proposition, two of the authors examined self-construal and pilgrimage travel among members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The study’s results,
Dieser, Lankford, and Walker (2003) contend, suggest that self-construal should be taken into account when leisure activities involving members of religious groups are examined. Similarly, founded on Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) work, Bragg (1996) has argued that, because the “consequences of an interdependent view of the self can be extended to consequences of an ecological view of the self, simply by expanding ‘others’ to include the nature environment” (p. 98), an ecologically-interdependent self may exist. If correct, this could have implications for eco-tourism, outdoor recreation, et cetera. In conclusion, we would like to thank Caldwell for pointing out the need to look at self-construal, identity, and leisure more fully because, based on the additional information we have been able to discuss here, we believe it makes our case even stronger.

Caldwell also states that, because some of our article’s examples (e.g., visiting a coffee house; deciding what to drink; deciding what kind of sandwich to eat) are “no big deal,” our arguments about how self-construal affects choice are also inconsequential. A closer look at the activities we mention, however, suggests that they are all examples of what Kelly (1999) refers to as leisure’s “core.” Although core leisure activities are low cost and relatively accessible, Kelly notes that they occupy:

> the greatest amount of time, especially in those periods between scheduled events. Further, such core activities often express and develop those primary relationships that are highly valued by most adults. They are woven into the household roles and investments that are the core of values as well as of activity patterns. (p. 143)

These core leisure activities are important in both leisure programming (Edginton, Hudson, Dieser, & Edginton, 2004) and in other leisure endeavors. For example, Mok (2001) highlighted how certain tourism and hospitality organizations use the divergence hypothesis because consumers from different cultural backgrounds find these issues relevant, such as serving “fish cakes and fish fingers in the United Kingdom, but beef bourguignonne and coq au vin in France, and vitello con funghi and braviola in Italy” (p. 271). Likewise Simon’s (2003) observational case study regarding the life of her sister, a single woman with disabilities, underscores that buying coffee is not an inconsequential act, instead it is a leisure activity that allows choice and the development of friendship and meaning. Thus, Caldwell fails to recognize that the “entirely trivial” types of activities we describe are an important aspect of leisure and, especially for interdependent selves, they often provide valuable opportunities to express and develop relationships with significant others.

Inarguably, Caldwell’s final criticism—that our discussion of self-construal and intrinsic motivation suffers from “conceptual confusion”—is the most serious. Let us be clear; we are in agreement with her statement that “much conceptual and methodological work is needed to better understand the related constructs of autonomy, motivation, agency, control, and choice, and when and why these are important, especially to leisure re-
search.” We would argue, however, that in order to fully understand these concepts we must first understand that they can and do vary across cultures (e.g., personal choice vs. in-group member choice; Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). We would also add the construct of freedom to her list, both because it is a noticeable omission and because it helps underscore another of our earlier article’s arguments. Specifically, in a recent paper Baldwin and Caldwell (2003) describe the development of a subscale to measure adolescents’ intrinsic motivation during leisure, and they note that the item “I do what I do in my free time because of sense of freedom” was initially included. The results of a reliability analysis indicated, though, that this item should be dropped, with the researchers stating that: “whereas the other intrinsic motivation items conveyed enjoyment and desire, the adolescents may have interpreted freedom as lack of restrictions rather than choice [italics added]” (p. 137). We mention this example as it illustrates that Western researchers are so used to conflating the constructs of freedom/personal choice and intrinsic motivation that they are not even aware they are doing so; and, as was made evident in our original article, in this respect Caldwell and colleague are in no way alone.

There is another aspect of the “conceptual confusion” issue that must be addressed. In Caldwell’s response she describes two other types of motivation identified in Deci and Ryan’s (1985) self-determination theory (SDT)—introjected and integrated. In our original article we chose not to discuss any non-intrinsic motivations because we felt our argument was already sufficiently complex and that any further extension would require substantially more space. However, given a second chance to do so, we will now, briefly, outline our views on SDT.

According to Caldwell: (a) although externally compelled, because the above motivations are internalized, feelings of autonomy or self-determination can occur; and (b) based on Ryan (1993), autonomy “literally means ‘self-governing’ and therefore implies regulation by the self” and “insofar as one’s actions are perceived to be engendered by forces outside the self (ego-center) or are not fully condoned or endorsed by the self, then willing or self-determination is not in evidence.” Building off this, she states that: “choosing to play soccer because it is valued by one’s parents, and not because one loves the game, is another example of this integrated or introjected form of motivation (see Ryan & Deci, 2000a; 2000b) that is still autonomous—it is self-endorsed but not intrinsically motivated.” In contrast with the above, how might you, if you were an interdependent self, react in a similar situation? Because you perceive your parents as knowing soccer (better than you do, at least), as knowing you (perhaps in a more realistic manner than you yourself do), and as acting in your best interests (rather than in their own), you would be intrinsically motivated to play because: (a) you feel close to your parents since, by taking the time and effort to choose which specific activity you should play, they show how much they care for you (thus satisfying your need for interpersonal relatedness; Deci & Ryan, 2000); (b) the act is self-endorsed, since you willingly delegate the choice of playing to
your parents (thus satisfying your need for autonomy; Deci & Ryan, 2000); and, possibly, (c) your parents’ perceived intrinsic motivation for soccer is infectious (due to the social contagion effect; Wild & Enzle, 2002). In conclusion, we want to make clear that we do not believe that either SDT or the leisure research built upon it is incorrect; rather, because neither adequately incorporates or satisfactorily explains the primary motivations of interdependent selves or the interdependent motivations of independent selves, both should be considered as being incomplete.

We appreciate and respect Roger Mannell and Linda Caldwell’s comments, and we will refer to them often as we continue to refine our ideas. When all is said and done, however, we still hold that the right exclamation remains “Go!” not “Whoa!”

References


